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1INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Each of the amici curiae is a professor who has
published books or articles on affirmative action or
American constitutional history.
Amici submit this brief to show the true place of
Michigan’s Proposal 2 in American constitutional
history; as an illegitimate attempt by a temporary
majority to prevent a racial minority from achieving
integration through the normal political and
administrative processes. During the Jim Crow era, the
Supreme Court approved such restrictions on the
political activity of racial minorities, but since the
dawn of the modern Civil Rights era, the Supreme
Court has protected the fairness of the political process
against these types of distortions.
Amici are: Michelle Adams, Professor of Law,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Richard L. Aynes,
John F. Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law,
University of Akron Law School; Michael A. Lawrence,
Associate Dean for International and Graduate
Programs and Professor of Law, Michigan State
University College of Law; Michael Perry, Robert W.
Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory University School of
Law; Richard Saphire, Professor Emeritus, University
of Dayton Law School; and Rebecca Zietlow, Charles W.
1 Under Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, amici state that no
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund
the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission. All parties have consented to this filing.
2Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of
Toledo College of Law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The purpose of this brief is to place the dispute over
affirmative action in Michigan’s public universities
within a broader historical context. State constitutional
amendments such as Proposal 2 are not uncommon in
American history.  In reaction to calls for reform from
a minority group – whether it be the end of slavery, the
enactment of non-discrimination laws, or the adoption
of voluntary programs of racial integration – the
majority has often responded by attempting to prevent
the debate from occurring, by denying members of the
minority group the opportunity to participate in the
political process, or by making it impossible for the
government to adopt the reform.  State constitutional
amendments like Proposal 2 are unconstitutional
because they deny minority groups the equal right to
achieve their goals through the normal political
process. 
ARGUMENT
I. CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS ARE
EXERCISES IN DEMOCRACY
Movements for civil rights express the deepest
yearnings of Americans for fundamental fairness and
reflect our enduring faith in democracy. These
struggles have often commanded the attention and
consumed the energy of entire generations of American
citizens.  Carrie Chapman Catt described the women’s
suffrage movement in these words:
3“To get the word ‘male’ in effect out of the
Constitution cost the women of the country fifty-
two years of pauseless campaign...  During that
time they were forced to conduct fifty-six
campaigns of referenda to male voters; 480
campaigns to get Legislatures to submit suffrage
amendments to voters; 47 campaigns to get
State constitutional conventions to write woman
suffrage into state constitutions; 277 campaigns
to get State party conventions to include woman
suffrage planks in party platforms, and 19
campaigns with 19 successive Congresses.” 
Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler,
Women Suffrage and Politics 107 (New York,
Chas. Scribners Sons, 1923).
Peaceful change is possible only if the democratic
process is permitted to operate on a non-discriminatory
basis.  A temporary majority may not defend its
privileges by making it impossible for the government
to respond to the minority.
4II. WHEN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS
BEGIN TO ACHIEVE VICTORIES, THE
TEMPORARY MAJORITY OFTEN
RESPONDS BY ATTEMPTING TO MAKE IT
MORE DIFFICULT FOR MINORITIES TO
ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS THROUGH THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
When a movement for civil rights begins to make
progress and accumulates victories in the legal and
legislative arenas, the majority of the public pushes
back and resists the minority’s claims for equal
opportunity. Favorable court decisions may be reversed
and civil rights laws may be repealed.  This back-and-
forth interaction, the slow and halting pace of human
progress, is to be expected within any adversarial
system of justice or democratic political process.  It is
of course legitimate for the majority to assert its views
both in the courts and before political bodies in seeking
to persuade judges, legislators, and other public
officials that the minority should not be granted the
rights or opportunities they seek.
 
However, there is another common tactic – an
illegitimate one – that is often utilized by members of
a then-existing majority who resist reform.  That is to
distort the political process to make it more difficult for
the minority than it is for the temporary majority to
obtain the passage of laws or adoption of policies that
reflect its views or interests.  These tactics take many
forms: restrictions on freedom of speech, denial of
voting rights, or laws that constrain the authority of
governmental institutions to enact reforms sought by
the minority. Proposal 2 is an example of the third type
of illegitimate tactic.
5 
It was measures like Proposal 2 that led to the Civil
War.  The Civil War erupted in part because the
southern states adopted amendments to their state
constitutions that made it impossible to limit or abolish
slavery through the democratic process.  As a result,
the conflict over slavery was transformed from a social,
political, and economic contest into a military
confrontation.  The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to overrule these
types of barriers to the political success of minorities,
and to prohibit these types of laws from being enacted
in the future.
III. DURING THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD,
SUPPORTERS OF SLAVERY ADOPTED
LAWS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS THAT MADE IT
IMPOSSIBLE FOR SLAVERY TO BE
A B O L I S H E D  T H R O U G H  T H E
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, THUS LEADING
TO THE CIVIL WAR
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment becomes
more clear when we consider the nature of the political
crisis that led to the Civil War.
Many people in the antislavery movement hoped to
persuade the people of the south to reject slavery.  To
achieve that purpose, antislavery advocates published
works intended to stoke debate and stimulate
democratic action. See, e.g., Angelina Grimke, Appeal
to the Christian Women of the South (1836) (contending
that slavery is contrary to moral and religious
teachings); Hinton Helper, The Impending Crisis In the
6South (1857) (addressed to the non-slaveholding whites
of the south and contending that slavery was harmful
to their economic interests).  However, instead of
generating a robust debate on slavery in the south,
these works were banned and burned.  See e.g., An Act
to Suppress the Circulation of Incendiary Publications,
ch. 66, 1836 Va. Acts 44-45 (outlawing antislavery
books and speeches); Shannon D. Gilreath, The
Technicolor Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism,
Ethical Norms, and Legal Pedagogy, 9 Tex. J. Civ. Lib.
& Civ. Rts. 23, 34 fn. 63 (2003) (Grimke’s Appeal
publicly burned by South Carolina postmasters).  The
censorship of dissent over the issue of slavery
precluded the use of the democratic process to abolish
the institution.  State constitutional amendments
prohibiting the abolition of slavery had a similar effect.
The southern states had not always prohibited
public discussion about the merits of slavery.  In
January and February of 1832, in the wake of the Nat
Turner rebellion, the Virginia General Assembly
earnestly debated a bill that would have instituted a
plan of gradual emancipation of slaves within the state. 
The bill was defeated by a margin of 73-58.  See
Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton
Helper’s Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech,
Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First
Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Chi-Kent L.
Rev. 1113, 1128 (1993). It was the last time that a state
that would eventually join the Confederacy submitted
the issue of slavery to the political process.
 
In the 1830s and 1840s southern attitudes towards
slavery hardened and a number of laws were adopted
that would make it impossible to resolve the continued
7existence of slavery through the democratic process. 
Free negroes lost the right to vote (see North Carolina
History Project, Constitution of 1835, at
http://www.northcarolinahistory.org/commentary/32/
entry; and NCPedia, John C. Sanders, NC
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  H i s t o r y  1 7 7 6 - 1 8 6 6 ,  a t
http://ncpedia.org/government/constitution1776); it was
forbidden to teach slaves to read and write (Curtis, The
1859 Crisis, supra at 1123); and, finally, it became
illegal to promote the abolition of slavery.  (See Michael
Kent Curtis, Free Speech, “The People’s Darling
Privilege”: Struggles for Freedom of Expression in
American History (2000), pages 131-154 (describing the
efforts of southern states to make public opposition to
slavery illegal); id. at 194-215 (describing legal theories
supporting suppression of slavery agitation); id. at 271-
299 (describing the southern response to Helper’s
Impending Crisis and the trials of Daniel Worth in
North Carolina for circulating it).  Even at the federal
level laws and policies were adopted to silence
antislavery views.  The “Gag Rule” was adopted
prohibiting discussion of abolition in Congress, and the
Post Office refused to carry antislavery newspapers or
other materials advocating emancipation into the
southern states.  (See Curtis, Free Speech, pages 155-
181 (describing federal efforts to silence opposition to
slavery)).
Foremost among the legal changes withdrawing
slavery from the political process were amendments to
the constitutions of many of the states that later
formed the Confederacy.  Those amendments withdrew
the power of the state legislatures to abolish slavery. 
The Virginia Constitution of 1851 provided:
8The general assembly shall not emancipate any
slave, or the descendant of any slave, either
before or after the birth of such descendant. 
(Vir. Const. of 1851, art. IV, § 21)
This constitution also granted the state legislature the
power to “impose such restrictions and conditions as
they shall deem proper on the power of slave-owners to
emancipate their slaves ….”  (Vir. Const. of 1851, art.
IV, § 20).  According to historian Kenneth Stampp,
“Most southern constitutions prohibited the
legislatures from emancipating slaves without both the
consent of the owners and the payment of a full
equivalent in money.”  Kenneth M. Stampp, The
Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South
198 (1956).  See, e.g., Ala. Const. of 1819, art. VI, § 1;
Ark. Const. of 1836, art. VII, § 1; Fla. Const. of 1838,
art. XVI, § 1; Miss. Const. of 1817, art. VI, § 1; Tenn.
Const. of 1834, art. II, sec. 31; Tex. Const. of 1845, art.
VIII, § 1.
Abraham Lincoln condemned these state
constitutional amendments in his famous “Hundred
Keys” speech in Springfield, Illinois, on June 26, 1857. 
Lincoln observed that most Americans of the
revolutionary generation believed that slavery was
wrong and expected its eventual extinction, but that
the present generation had enacted laws – including
amendments to their state constitutions – that made
slavery a virtual “prison house.”  Speaking of the
Revolutionary period, Lincoln said:
In those days, as I understand, masters could, at
their own pleasure, emancipate their slaves; but
since then, such legal restraints have been made
9upon emancipation, as to amount almost to
prohibition. In those days, Legislatures held the
unquestioned power to abolish slavery in their
respective States; but now it is becoming quite
fashionable for State Constitutions to withhold
that power from the Legislatures. 2 Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln 404 (Roy P. Basler,
ed. 1953).
Lincoln employed a powerful metaphor to express the
fact that the purpose of these state constitutional
amendments was to make it impossible to abolish
slavery:
They have him in his prison house; they have
searched his person, and left no prying
instrument with him. One after another they
have closed the heavy iron doors upon him, and
now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a
lock of a hundred keys, which can never be
unlocked without the concurrence of every key;
the keys in the hands of a hundred different
men, and they scattered to a hundred different
and distant places; and they stand musing as to
what invention, in all the dominions of mind and
matter, can be produced to make the
impossibility of his escape more complete than it
is. Id.
The Civil War is the central tragedy of American
history and the central failure of American democracy. 
Why were our ancestors unable to resolve the question
of slavery peacefully?  Why were we unable to abolish
slavery through the democratic process?
10
Contemporaries believed that democracy failed
because it was not given the opportunity to succeed.  In
a letter to John C. Calhoun, Francis Lieber wrote:
“If you fear discussion, if you maintain that the
South cannot afford it, then you admit at the
same time that the whole institution is to be
kept up by violence only, and is against the
spirit of the times and unameliorable, which
means, in other words, that violence supports it,
and violence will be its end.”  Curtis, Free
Speech, at 193.
In an 1864 editorial Harper’s Weekly drew a similar
conclusion about the cause of the war:
“It was the knowledge that, if the right of free
speech, guaranteed by the Constitution, were
tolerated in the South, slavery would be
destroyed by the common-sense of the Southern
people, which made Calhoun and all his school
insist upon suppressing it.  Consequently, in its
most important provision, the Constitution has
been a dead letter in every slave State for more
than thirty years.”  “The Truth Confessed,”
Harper’s Wkly., Jan. 16, 1864, at 34 in Richard
L. Aynes, 18 Journal of Contemporary Legal
Issues 77, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against
the States: The History and the Future (2009).
Present-day historians agree.  Michael Curtis
states:
“Vocal domestic Southern opposition to slavery
reached a brief high water mark in the 1830s
11
and thereinafter began to recede in much of the
South.  Southern laws and vigilance committees
silenced abolition expression and did their best
to take opposition to slavery off the Southern
political agenda.  As a result, the institution
could only be dislodged by violence.”  Curtis,
Free Speech, at 192-193.
Avery Craven states, “The most significant thing
about the American Civil War is that it represents a
complete breakdown of the democratic process.”  Avery
Craven, The 1840’s and the Democratic Process,
Journal of Southern History XVI (1950), pp. 161-76, in
Kenneth M. Stampp, The Causes of the Civil War 195
(Simon & Schuster 1991).  Michael Holt agrees: “The
Civil War represented an utter and unique breakdown
of the normal democratic political process.”  Michael F.
Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s 1 (Norton, 1978).
In the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
antebellum courts were powerless to protect the
democratic process against state laws and practices
that prevented citizens and legislators from addressing
the evils of slavery, and this judicial powerlessness led
directly to the Civil War.  A leading objective of the
newly-formed Republican Party was to incorporate the
principles of the Declaration into the Constitution
because this was “essential to the preservation of our
republican institutions.”  See Plank 2 of the 1860
Republican Party Platform in John Wooley and
Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, The
R e p u b l i c a n  P l a t f o r m  o f  1 8 6 0 ,  a t
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29
620#axzzlalRmV7UZ.  Following the war under the
leadership of Republicans in Congress the nation
12
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment which was
designed, intended, and understood to prohibit
interference with the democratic operation of the
political process.  Despite this, however, for many
decades the states continued to adopt anti-democratic
laws and state constitutional amendments that were
intended to make it impossible for minorities to achieve
progress through the democratic process.  Nearly a
century passed before the Supreme Court fulfilled its
duty under the Fourteenth Amendment and declared
these laws unconstitutional.
IV. FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR THE OPPONENTS OF
C I V I L  R I G H T S  A N D  R A C I A L
INTEGRATION SOUGHT TO REMOVE
T H E S E  S U B J E C T S  F R O M
CONSIDERATION BY THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS.  THE SUPREME COURT
EVENTUALLY STUCK DOWN THESE
L A W S  A N D  C O N S T I T U T I O N A L
AMENDMENTS THAT DISTORTED THE
POLITICAL PROCESS.
For more than a century after the Civil War similar
illegitimate tactics were employed to distort the
political process and delay the attainment of equal
rights for black citizens and to block integration.  These
tactics included restrictions on freedom of speech,
impediments to the right to vote, and super-
majoritarian barriers to government action.  As before
the Civil War, these tactics both limited discussion of
the issues and interfered with the democratic process. 
These tactics have come to be known as the
“Mississippi Plan.”  The noted historian C. Vann
13
Woodward describes the three stages of the Mississippi
Plan, which were widely copied across the south.  In
1875, white mobs terrorized African-American
candidates and voters; in 1890, state laws and
constitutional amendments enacting poll taxes, literacy
tests, and property qualifications were adopted to
deprive African-Americans of the right to vote; and in
1954 the Citizens Councils were formed “to wage
unrelenting war in defense of segregation.”  C. Vann
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 152
(Oxford University Press 1966).  In 1898 the Supreme
Court upheld the amendments to the Mississippi
constitution that were used to bar African-Americans
from exercising the franchise.  Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U.S. 213 (1898).  These tactics were successful in
depriving African-Americans of the opportunity to
participate in the political process.  For example, in
1896, there were 130,334 African-Americans registered
to vote in the State of Louisiana; in 1904, there were
only 1,342.  Woodward, at 85.  In the 1950’s, only two
percent of adult African-Americans in the State of
Mississippi were registered to vote.  Woodward, at 174. 
State constitutions from this era also required the
separation of children by race in public schools. See,
e.g., Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. XIV, § 256 (“Separate
schools shall be provided for white and colored
children, and no child of either race shall be permitted
to attend a school of the other race.”); Geo. Const. of
1877, art. VIII, § 1 (“The schools shall be free to all
children of the State, but separate schools shall be
provided for the white and colored races.”)
The foregoing portions of this brief describe how in
response to the antislavery movement the southern
states made changes to their constitutions limiting the
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power of their state legislatures to abolish slavery, and
how in response to Reconstruction states adopted laws
and constitutional amendments limiting the franchise
and requiring segregation of the races. The same
strategy was employed during the modern civil rights
era. After Brown v. Board of Education was decided a
number of states enacted laws and constitutional
amendments that were intended to make it impossible
for their public institutions to comply with that
decision.  See e.g., Ala. Const., art. XIV, § 256 amend.
111 (1956) (eliminating the requirement that the state
provide every child a free public education and
permitting the state to turn over land and buildings to
private educational institutions); Opinion of the
Justices No. 333, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993),
referencing Alabama Coalition for Equity, et a. v Hunt,
CV-90-883 (striking down Amendment 111 because it
was enacted for a discriminatory purpose); Virginia
Pupil Placement Act, VA Code. §22-232.1 et seq. (1950),
repealed in 1966 (divesting local school boards of
authority to assign children to particular schools and
placing that authority in a State Pupil Placement
Board which without exception assigned children to
separate schools based upon their race); see generally
1958 American Jewish Year Book pp.44-68, available at
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1958_4_
USCivicPolitical.pdf, (describing the laws and
constitutional amendments adopted in several states to
oppose racial integration of the public schools); id. at 69
(table entitled “Major Types of Legislation Adopted in
Eleven Southern States Since 1952 Designed to
Prevent or Control Desegregation,” reprinted from
Southern School News, September 1957).  These types
of laws, like Proposal 2, are unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause because they prohibit state-
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supported educational institutions from exercising
their discretion to choose to adopt policies of racial
integration.
After 1938 the Supreme Court began to address
many of the abuses that had accumulated during the
Jim Crow era.  In a series of cases, the Court struck
down barriers to minorities’ freedom of expression and
the right to vote, as well as barriers to the adoption of
anti-discrimination laws and policies of racial
integration.  A theme that is common to many of these
cases is that the Court was restoring democracy by
striking down laws that interfered with the right of
minorities and their allies to seek justice through the
normal political process.  These decisions are consonant
with what John Hart Ely has called “representation-
reinforcement” – the role of the courts as the guardian
of democracy.  John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:
A Theory of Judicial Review 87-104 (1980).
The first series of cases upheld the First
Amendment rights of minorities to advocate in the
political process.  In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) the
Court struck down Alabama and Virginia laws that
were intended to hinder the operation of the nation’s
leading civil rights organization.   In Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) and Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1964) the Court upheld the right of
citizens to engage in peaceful protests in support of
civil rights.  And in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) the Court prohibited the states from
using the law of libel to silence newspapers from
covering the civil rights movement.
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The second set of cases reaffirmed and protected the
right to vote and the effectiveness of those votes.  In
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) the Supreme
Court abolished white primaries, thus opening the
nomination process to African-Americans.  See also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down
malapportionment of the Alabama legislature); Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(striking down Virginia poll tax); and Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 615 (1982) (striking down an at-large
representation scheme in a rural Georgia county).  In
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an
Alabama constitutional provision adopted in 1901 that
barred felons from voting.  The Court found this
provision to be unconstitutional because it was adopted
for the purpose of disenfranchising African-Americans. 
Id. at 229 (stating, “the Alabama Constitutional
Convention of 1901 was part of a movement that swept
the post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise
blacks.”).  In all of these cases the Supreme Court
removed impediments to voting and protected the
rights of all citizens, regardless of race, to participate
in the political process on an equal basis.
In a third set of cases, most closely analogous to the
issue at hand, the Court invalidated barriers to
minorities achieving success in the political process,
including constitutional amendments like Proposal 2.
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
three such popularly-enacted laws and found them all
to be invalid.  In the first case, the Court struck down
a California constitutional amendment that prohibited
the state legislature from enacting fair housing laws. 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).  In a second
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case, the Court struck down an amendment to the city
charter of Akron that made it more difficult to enact
fair housing laws.  Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 395
(1969).  In a third case, the Court rejected a statewide
initiative prohibiting school districts from voluntarily
busing children for integration.  Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).  In all of
these cases, the laws had a similar effect to Proposal 2
– blocking minorities from using the democratic process
to secure the adoption of anti-discrimination measures
or policies promoting racial integration.  Accordingly,
in all of these cases the laws were declared
unconstitutional.
In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) the
Supreme Court announced a simple guiding principle
that explains the decisions in Reitman, Seattle School
District, and Hunter.  In Romer the Court stated:
A law declaring that in general it shall be more
difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the
most literal sense. 517 U.S., at 633.
In all of these cases the Supreme Court properly
struck down state laws that interfered with the equal
right of minority groups to end discrimination and
promote integration.
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V. PROPOSAL 2 IS SIMILAR TO OTHER
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
THAT HAVE BEEN PROPERLY
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Michigan Proposal 2 makes it more difficult for
public universities to integrate their institutions as
allowed by this Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003). The state constitutional amendment makes
it more difficult for African-Americans and other racial
minorities to “seek aid from the government” in their
admission to state universities.  The fact that Proposal
2 is a product of direct democracy does not diminish the
fact that it is profoundly anti-democratic.  It is but one
example of the long history of discriminatory state
constitutional amendments and other laws adopted by
a temporary majority to prevent the minority from
being able to make progress in civil rights through
normal governmental channels.  The closest analogy to
Proposal 2 is the statewide initiative struck down in
Washington v. Seattle School District that prohibited
school districts from voluntarily adopting programs of
busing to integrate the public schools.
   
Throughout American history movements for civil
rights have sought to transform their goals into law by
pursuing justice in the courts and the adoption of
legislation and official policies through the political
process.  While it is legitimate for a majority to refuse
to adopt civil rights policies or to repeal policies that
have already been adopted, it is illegitimate for a
temporary majority to enact constitutional
amendments such as Proposal 2 that distort the
political process to make it more difficult for the
minority to achieve its goals.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the decision of the Sixth
Circuit and rule that Michigan Proposal 2 is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
because it makes it more difficult for minorities to
achieve integration of the public universities through
normal political and administrative processes. 
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